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WHY FAULKNER?
‘‘A Sight-Draft Dated Yesterday’’: Faulkner’s
Uninsured Immortality
P h i l i p M . We i n s t e i n
‘‘Breathing is a sight-draft dated yesterday,’’ says Will Varner in The
Hamlet.1 Webster defines a ‘‘sight draft’’ as a ‘‘draft payable upon presen-
tation’’; Varner is talking about the unpredictable moment of one’s own
death. He figures our uninsured breathing as a check already signed, a
resource the gods have issued and can recall at any moment as of ‘‘yester-
day.’’ Mere ‘‘presentation’’—or being in the present—threatens us ut-
terly. I choose this passage in order to focus on temporality in three ways:
as a central issue of this conference (Faulkner at 100), as a driving con-
cern of modernism itself and of Faulkner’s modernist practice, and finally
as a core dimension of his appeal thirty-five years after his death.
Faulkner’s uninsured immortality: the energy and anxiety that beset
this year’s conference stem from our awareness that his immortality is in
fact mortal—that he lives in his posthumeity only so long as we continue
to breathe life into him, that his currency itself is a check long since
dated and always open to recall, liquidation. The man died in 1962, the
writer has continued since then to flourish. He still flourishes, but there
is no one in this room who does not know that he too can die. This year’s
conference, more than the earlier ones, is about the ratio between what
is dead in his work, what still lives, and what has yet to live.
Why Faulkner? That is the topic of our panel, and I think it sets us
apart from the other panels which—however critical they will be—begin
by assuming his importance. Their business is more to analyze and recon-
ceive that importance. Ours is to ask—or answer—why attend to him at
all. To be sure, we are likely to read our topic less as a question (why
Faulkner?) and more as an answer (why Faulkner). Don Kartiganer and
his cohorts won’t have been tempted to invite others among our col-
leagues—and their name is legion—for whom the answer to the question
of ‘‘why Faulkner?’’ is: why indeed?
If that question is serious and not merely rhetorical, it could mean
several things: Why Faulkner instead of other writers? Why Faulkner
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46 Faulkner’s Uninsured Immortality
when his work has ceased to speak to a readership suspicious of canonical
narratives of white male travail? Why Faulkner when his texts—no
longer sheltered by a modernist commitment to formal innovation—
seem to many readers to be willfully, perversely unreadable? Or, perhaps
most insidious, why Faulkner in a postmodern climate in which reading
itself has lost much of its prestige as a truth-discerning activity? This last
meaning of ‘‘why Faulkner’’ could be reduced to: ‘‘what is the point of
reading anything that difficult when, regardless of its contortions, it can
never escape its ideological frame, can never represent the real?’’ Thanks
to the past twenty years’ success of poststructuralism and its sequel, cul-
tural studies, we have reached something like a massive distrust of lan-
guage itself as a vehicle reliably connecting writer and world. Why
Faulkner indeed?2
Here is contemporary critic Jane Flax characterizing the poststructura-
list stance toward the text: ‘‘The text is not the product of the conscious-
ness of a singular author making present some aspect of experience,
history, or thought. . . . The subject of writing is a ‘system of relations
between strata . . . the psyche, society, the world.’ ’’3 What professional
Faulknerian here has not read such words—if not written them—in
countless papers by students and colleagues? Yet who writes a line of
poetry or prose in assent to these claims? Who would go to the trouble
to write responsibly if this activity involved neither self nor experience
nor thought, but instead the gassy vagueness of a ‘‘system of relations
between strata’’? Can there be writerly responsibility—not to mention
other sorts of responsibility—without a concept of the minimally viable
subject? This suspicion calls into question not only Faulkner’s impor-
tance, but his very coherence.
I am impatient with the brittle insistence that, since you do not master
your utterance entirely, you do not master it at all—and more, there is
no ‘‘you’’ there in the first place. At a recent lecture on the revisionary
moves of a medieval artist, I heard the speaker say that the artist’s ‘‘inten-
tions’’ were not only inscrutable but—citing a master critic—that ‘‘inten-
tion’’ was a term we should never use for human creativity. And I
thought, if we can’t speak of human creativity in terms of ‘‘intention,’’
what realm—other than the pedestrian one of messages—does the term
exist for? It seems to me a term we simply cannot do without, even
though we cannot use it cleanly, just as subject and author are terms we
cannot do without, even though we cannot use them cleanly. If we re-
move all trust from both the author who intends and the word that con-
veys, it is difficult to maintain that reading matters. If what Faulkner
‘‘means’’ lodges only minimally in what we may construe him to have
intended his words to say, and maximally in larger cultural paradigms
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philip m . weinstein 47
that predetermine him (the key to which, of course, the informed critic
possesses, often in advance of reading him), how could the labor he spent
to get his writing right matter?4 Who in this hypersuspicious postmodern
climate is willing to credit—to move with—the intricate twists and turns,
the gorgeous arabesques, of Faulkner’s prose?
When I was a teenager, my father warned me of the dangers of driving.
You have to be totally alert, he said; otherwise you’ll kill yourself and
others. I believed this advice until I took my first long trip in the car.
After about three hours of driving (with six more to follow), I realized
that total alertness was not only impossible, it was bad advice. You must,
at a certain point, submit to the vehicle if you want it to take you any-
where. We must revalidate the experience of submitting to the literary
vehicle, learning all we can about the tricky and far from obvious moves
it can make, yet granting it the power to take us somewhere. To know in
advance, always and negatively, where it is going to take us is to foreclose
the pleasure—let alone knowledge—such travel may afford. We former
New Critics paid a huge price in not knowing the liabilities intrinsic to
the vehicle—we were unforgivably innocent readers—but we did take
trips. Let me return, now, to that ‘‘sight-draft dated yesterday.’’
Modernism itself may be generalized as a variously inflected under-
standing that ‘‘breathing is a sight-draft dated yesterday.’’5 That is to say,
an understanding that human life, because it is in time and destined for
death, is radically groundless. Radically groundless: rootedly unrootable,
the Latin root in ‘‘radical’’suggests. How hard it is to make language give
up its soothing message of groundedness, as Nietzsche knew when he
said, ‘‘I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in
grammar.’’6 Lawful grammar suggests a lawful world being represented
by that grammar. One of the most salient aspects of modernist practice is
its insistence on innovative linguistic structures that shatter these inertial
conventions, revealing that only our fictions—for better and for worse—
sustain our sense of grounding. Our being-in-time is our central intolera-
ble reality in need of fiction. Perhaps culture’s dearest function is to
provide credible fictions for humanizing time. The clichés we use to
characterize different periods of history—the Medieval world view, the
Enlightenment, Romanticism—could be seen as so many expressions of
time made humanly meaningful: as medieval preparation for the afterlife,
as enlightenment acquisition of humane reason, as romantic rebellion of
the spirit against the slavishness of convention. All of these models pro-
vide ‘‘ends’’ to stave off our otherwise unbearable sense of the ‘‘end.’’
When modernism repudiates its culture’s various models for domesti-
cating temporality, it declares it alienation. ‘‘This abstract structure of
temporality,’’ writes Fredric Jameson, ‘‘clearly cannot emerge until the
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48 Faulkner’s Uninsured Immortality
older traditional activities, projects, rituals through which time was expe-
rienced, and from which it was indistinguishable, have broken down.’’7
In the unalienated realism of Balzac and Dickens and Tolstoy, time is the
medium in which human projects at first falter, then refine themselves,
and finally succeed—or if they fail, they fail reasonably. But time ceases
in modernism to be a familiar modality and becomes instead a cunning
and indecipherable puzzle, as in Joyce and Eliot, or a monster of oblivion
and redemption, as in Proust, or the perpetrator of a nightmarish bad
joke, as one wakes up to discover in Kafka. In Faulkner time rears its
head in a fashion that is humbler but no less terrifying: ‘‘Something is
going to happen to me.’’
‘‘Something is going to happen to me’’: this signature Faulknerian
phrase emerges inside the heightened consciousness of Temple Drake in
Sanctuary, Joe Christmas in Light in August, and Harry Wilbourne in If
I Forget Thee, Jerusalem. All of these characters think this thought at the
moment of collapse of whatever protective codes of grounding they have
drawn on to sustain their sanity. They cease to be an ‘‘I’’ who acts and
become a ‘‘me’’ who is acted upon. Hurled into an encounter which dis-
ables their culturally trained defenses—their habitual ways of saying ‘‘I’’
and thinking it means something—they discover their body going awry,
its rhythms of breathing (its ‘‘sight-draft dated yesterday’’) being called
in and liquidated. A moment of intolerable present time has decapitated
all preceding domesticated time; this decapitation registers on and
through the body.8
Faulkner had this insight as early as Soldiers’ Pay; the speechlessly
wounded Donald Mahon is undone by encounters he can suffer without
ever subjectifying. Incapacity beyond the reach of therapy calls to Faulk-
ner, shaping powerfully the incurable plights of Bayard and Horace and
Temple. But it is Benjy Compson in whom Faulkner first fully releases
the poetry of irreparable deracination. For Benjy is simultaneously so
many things: the literal defective offspring of a once-noble family whom
neither parent knows how to caretake, the symbolic fruit of an incestuous
twentieth-century South that has not yet learned to desire the other, the
uselessly poetic vessel of perception and feeling beyond the reach of
normative culture’s contaminating codes, a wild child whose class rever-
berations Faulkner will later explore in Ike Snopes, whose race repercus-
sions he will touch on in Jim Bond. Whatever figure Benjy transmutes
into, the plasma at his core remains the same: nonadaption, the rebuke
of all schemas of maturation and empowerment.
As Faulkner proceeds through his career, the ramifications of nonadap-
tation widen. Early on, such scandalous encounter between self and cir-
cumstance seems metaphysical: ‘‘As though the clotting which is you,’’
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philip m . weinstein 49
Darl puts it in As I Lay Dying, ‘‘had dissolved into the original myriad
motion.’’9 Bundren projects, however stubbornly held, become subjected
to forces that either fracture them or render them absurd. The most pro-
found unselving force in that novel—and therefore the one most power-
fully resisted by each character’s system of defenses—is death itself,
Addie Bundren’s becoming, in time, not-Addie Bundren. In later novels
the unraveling of subjectivity—the hallmark of Faulknerian plot—
becomes less metaphysical and more cultural. Joe Christmas, Thomas
Sutpen, Charles Etienne St. Valery Bon: when these figures shatter, they
reveal—in the disarray that radiates into and out of them—an incoher-
ence in the scheme of things that is manmade, not natural or metaphysi-
cal, indeed normative, not aberrant. At his diagnostic best, Faulkner
shows the madness of the normative—shows, patiently and dizzingly,
how long-sustained cultural structures of recognition and empowerment
for some folks are simultaneously—for other folks—structures of nonac-
knowledgment and abuse. In Thomas Sutpen—he who is first the child
abused, he who is later the adult abusing—it comes together as one: we
end by seeing Absalom, Absalom! as an unbearable mapping of differen-
tial cultural positions (where you are on that map determines your
fate)—a map that only a Southerner both outsider and insider could de-
lineate in all its absurd and poignant contradictoriness.
No one has explored more movingly than Faulkner the cultural logic
of such undoings. Kafka’s parables of collapse and Joyce’s immersion of
the subject in his culture’s constraints both come to mind, but it takes
Faulkner to wed Kafka’s sense of the uncanny with Joyce’s familiarity
with norms, with—if you will—the reasonableness of norms. Hugh Ken-
ner once claimed that, for Faulknerian narrative to work, a region and a
history and a multigenerational family all had to be in place. (‘‘He needed
inarticulate blood ties,’’ Kenner wrote.10) In realism these familiar con-
tours would produce the Balzacian canvas of moves and countermoves
keyed to a set of recognizable cultural norms shared even when resisted,
all of this unfolding within a domesticated temporality in which night
follows day, maturity and old age follow childhood and youth. Perhaps
this is what Faulkner desired with his Yoknapatawpha chronicles, but it
is not what he achieved. A modernist sense of incapacitation holds him
in its grip: time does not behave, the same event ‘‘abrupts’’ anew and
‘‘repercusses’’ again, people and things become uncanny, go awry.
The grip I speak of is trauma itself, and it registers insistently upon
the Faulknerian body. ‘‘Breathing’’ is of the body, yet its being figured as
a ‘‘sight-draft dated yesterday’’ places it in the social. Faulkner’s drama
is of breathing gone wrong because of social arrangements gone wrong.
His achievement is less to summarize this disaster than to dramatize its
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50 Faulkner’s Uninsured Immortality
‘‘abruption’’ within the body and from body to body. He knew early on
that his culture’s most intractable contradictions operated within or be-
neath language, that language was a tool provided by culture, coopted by
the psyche’s defenses, and eloquent mainly for its evasions. Faulkner’s
greatness lodges in his decision not to judge but to cite this language in
all its variety, pathos, and offensiveness. He thus gives us, in an unparal-
leled manner, an entire social text. Rather than attempt to master his
culture’s contradictions and indict them through his own voice or that of
a delegated narrator, he arranges his memorable fictions architectoni-
cally, letting voice play against voice, no voice reliably his own. The ben-
efit of this move is a capacity to say even the most outrageous things
fearlessly, freshly, so long as they remain true to character. ‘‘I listen to
the voices,’’ Faulkner told Malcolm Cowley, ‘‘and when I put down what
the voices say, it’s right.’’11 As Keats’s Shakespeare ‘‘has as much delight
in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen,’’ so Faulkner is as drawn to Jason
Compson as to Gavin Stevens.12
The Faulkner I summon to answer the question ‘‘why Faulkner?’’ is a
writer who never pretended to domesticate time. In his great tragic work
he writes of wounds that do not heal, encounters that repercuss rather
than resolve. He is our supreme writer of the culturally unworkable. His
fiction is not pedagogic: in the presence of can’t matter and must matter
he knows that both are true and that they cannot coherently coexist. He
is our American witness who knows he is also witnessed—knows he is in
history’s gaze—but he does not pretend to know what he looks like wit-
nessed, as on this day in 1997 when we are gazing at him. His work
gathers an unparalleled authority in its generating of narrative structures
that call authority into question: who better than Faulkner has shown
us how men invent and enforce authority in the absence of authority’s
grounding? In short, he is the writer of pain radiated by the failure of
culture’s defenses rather than of wisdom garnered from the viability of
culture’s platitudes. The candor with which he accepts his own not-
knowing—a not-knowing he turns into the most intricate fictional struc-
tures of delay and revision and reversal rather than temporal mastery—
makes me think that the risk figured in a ‘‘sight-draft dated yesterday’’ is
exactly how he would want his work’s future to be viewed: ‘‘because it is
your milk, sour or not,’’ Tull thinks in As I Lay Dying, ‘‘because you
would rather have milk that will sour than to have milk that wont.’’13 The
milk that matters is milk that can sour, go off in time; the mark on the
paper that matters is, as Judith says in Absalom, Absalom!, the ‘‘mark on
something that was once for the reason that it can die someday, while the
block of stone cant be is because it never can become was.’’14 Faulkner’s
immortality is not only uninsured but uninsurable—a mark that ‘‘is’’ and
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therefore at perpetual risk of becoming ‘‘was’’—why would we defend it
otherwise?
NOTES
1. William Faulkner, The Hamlet, in Faulkner: Novels, 1936–1940 (New York: Library
of America, 1990), 1019.
2. For a fuller meditation on our contemporary discontent with Faulkner’s modernist
commitments, see the final chapters of my Faulkner’s Subject: A Cosmos No One Owns
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and What Else But Love? The Ordeal of
Race in Faulkner and Morrison (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
3. Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the
Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 197–98.
4. Arguments about intention are notoriously difficult, as my evasive wording reveals.
To identify authorial intention is, necessarily, to move through readerly construal. It takes
the critic’s claim to ‘‘access’’ the writer’s intentions, and such claims are always open to
contestation. My point is not that we critics ever get the author’s intentions right but that,
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seems that we cannot (at any rate we do not) characterize the manifold intelligence of works
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speaking, incoherently, about the ‘‘intentions of the text’’—as though it had intentions of
its own). At the least, I would propose that the author is a partner—and not just a dupe—of
the structure of intentions we may discern in his or her text. One may of course choose to
ignore this structure, but that leaves us, it seems to me, with an impoverished and conven-
tional substitute-text in place of the complex and far-from-innocent one the author wrote.
Obviously, this is not to say that writers know exactly what they are doing. It is to say
that—in their endless acts of vision and revision—they know a great deal about it. I might
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Bleikasten’s kindred argument (in this volume) about a ‘‘singular’’ Faulkner. I share with
Bleikasten a commitment to Faulkner’s texts as radically unpredicted by any of the cultural
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